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Current Problems With Venue In Georgia
Georgia's first constitution, the
Constitution of 1777, contained
a section providing that "all mat-
ters in dispute between contend-
ing parties, residing in different
counties, shall be tried in the
county where the defendant re-
sides, except in cases of real
estate, which shall be tried in
the county where such real
estate lies."' The practice of
specifying rules of venue in the
constitution thus dates from the
very beginning of our state and
has been repeated and expanded
in subsequent constitutional re-
visions. The Constitution of
1798, for example, added the rule
that joint obligors, residing in
different counties, may be sued
in the county of residence of
either.2 The Constitution of 1861
by C. Ronald Ellington
included an explicit provision
governing the place of venue for
equitable actions," and with the
adoption of the Constitution of
1868,4 all the present-day rules
of venue had been fixed as part
of the fundamental law of the
state."
There were, notwithstanding
the hierarchy of the venue rules
in our structure of laws, some
early objections from members
of the Bar that these venue rules
were being applied in an overly
technical way that worked to
defeat, rather than further, the
cause of justice. These objec-
tions were met in 1906 by the
firm rejoinder of Justice Lump-
kin that "the right to be sued in
the proper county is not merely
technical, but is a substantial,
constitutional right."6 This state-
ment by Justice Lumpkin still
aptly describes tile prevailing ju-
dicial attitude toward Georgia's
venue requirements.
On the other hand, over the
years many of the rules govern-
ing trial practice and procedure
in Georgia have been modern-
ized and revised in keeping with
contemporary needs and con-
cerns.7 In 1966 the General As-
sembly adopted the Civil Prac-
tice Act, Rule 1 of which pro-
claims that its provisions "shall
be construed to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive deter-
mination of every action."' Two
important provisions in the CPA
for promoting judicial economy
and efficiency are Rule 14 gov-
erning impleader and Rule 13
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dealing with counterclaims.
Impleader, or third-party prac-
tice, is the procedure by which
a defendant can bring into the
action one that he claims is lia-
ble to him for all or part of
plaintiff's claim against him.
Similarly, Rule 13 seeks to
promote the joinder of claims to
expedite the resolution of all the
controversies between the par-
ties in one suit to avoid a circuity
of actions and multiple litigation.
To these ends Rule 13(h) author-
izes the joinder of additional
parties for the purpose of adju-
dicating a counterclaim that has
been asserted to dispose of an
action in its entirety and to grant
complete relief to all the con-
cerned parties.'
While the Georgia appellate
courts have been receptive to
the advantages offered by im-
pleader and counterclaims,10
they have rigorously and unduly
adhered to the constitutional
mandate that in civil actions a
defendant is entitled to be sued
in the county of his residence,
unless the venue for the action
is controlled by one of the speci-
fied exceptions contained in the
Constitution.
Viewed in the abstract, per-
haps, this ancient rule of venue
is easy to apply and seems to
strike a sensible balance between
the interests of plaintiffs and de-
fendants, although the modern
trend is to give the plaintiff a
wider choice of places of venue
by allowing civil actions to be
brought as well where "a sub-
stantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim
occurred."'" However, in prac-
tice the results dictated by venue
concerns have often been less
than sensible. The availability
of obtaining venue for the action
against the defendant is as im-
portant as securing the requisite
personal jurisdiction. And, un-
fortunately, the strict application
of Georgia's constitutional venue
rules has seriously undermined
the effectiveness of the CPA
rules allowing impleader and
counterclaims. Given the scarci-
ty of judicial resources and the
often publicized backlog in trial
court calendars, the time has
come for a critical assessment
of the interaction of venue and
the rules authorizing impleader
and counterclaims in the CPA.
Impleader and the Legacy of
Register v. Stone
In the well-known case of
Register v. Stone's Independent
Oil Distributions, Inc. 1 2 the su-
preme court held that venue
must be independently estab-
lished before third-party defen-
dants could be impleaded under
Rule 14. The factual situation
in Register illustrates and typi-
fies the kind of case that im-
pleader was devised to handle;
yet, the Georgia venue require-
ments, as construed by the court,
barred its use.
In Register the plaintiff, a Mrs.
Bailey, commenced an action in
the Dodge Superior Court seek-
ing damages from various de-
fendants who she alleged were
jointly responsible for a multiple
vehicle collision that injured her
husband. Although some of the
defendants resided in counties
other than Dodge, venue was
proper against all the co-defen-
dants in the forum for the pur-
pose of plaintiff's original action
because joint tortfeasors may be
sued in the county of residence
of any one defendant. 13 How-
ever, after filing suit plaintiff
amended her complaint to strike
Register as a defendant. Stone,
one of the originally named de-
fendants, then sought to implead
Register as a third-party defen-
dant in the main action by con-
tending that Register was liable
through contribution to Stone for
a pro rata share of any verdict
and judgment returned in favor
of the plaintiff against Stone.
Register moved to dismiss the
third-party complaint on the
ground that as a resident of
Laurens County, venue could not
properly be had over him in
Dodge County, the forum of the
principal suit.
The supreme court upheld the
third-party defendant's venue
objections. Although recogniz-
ing that a joint tortfeasor's right
to contribution could be proced-
urally enforced through an im-
pleader action, the supreme court
ruled that such an action was in
the nature of an independent
suit that could be maintained
only in the county of the resi-
dence of the alleged joint tort-
feasor."4 This conclusion, rea-
soned the court, was demanded
because under the constitution
a defendant is entitled to be sued
in the county of his residence
and a procedural rule in the CPA
could not expand the venue of
such actions."5
The result in Register has been
both criticized 6 and defended
as unavoidable. 7 Certainly, it is
unfortunate and should have
been avoided if possible. And,
Judge Eberhardt, writing for the
court of appeals in the case be-
low, believed that it could be
avoided.'" The approach fol-
lowed by the court of appeals
was to view the impleader action
as an ancillary proceeding close-
ly connected with and arising
out of the dispute in the main
action. Hence, the need to estab-
lish venue independently was
obviated. Under the approach
adopted by the court of appeals,
the venue for the third-party ac-
tion was simply predicated on
the venue established in the main
action.
This, of course, is the approach
followed in federal practice
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where both subject-matter juris-
diction and venue are treated as
ancillary in third-party actions.' 9
To say, as the supreme court did
in Register, that the federal cases
are inapposite because the fed-
eral jurisdictional and venue
standards are different misses
the mark somewhat. Even in fed-
eral practice, impleader is not
deemed to expand the court's
jurisdiction. Rather, impleader is
deemed to warrant the use of the
court's powers of ancillary juris-
diction, i.e., a judicially devel-
oped concept based on the prem-
ise that a court which has juris-
diction over a case can, as an
incident of disposing of the case
in its entirety, decide other mat-
ters raised by the case over
which it would not have juris-
diction or venue if they were in-
dependently presented. Thus, be-
cause the defendant's right of
action against the third-party
under Rule 14 must be based on
the same aggregate core of facts
that constitutes plaintiff's claim,
the use of ancillary jurisdiction
enables the court having juris-
diction over plaintiff's claim to
determine the third-party claim
springing out of the same core
of facts without satisfying addi-
tional jurisdictional grounds.20
Therefore, by reversing the court
of appeals and requiring that
venue be independently estab-
lished, the supreme court in
Register appears to have re-
nounced the judicial power to
exercise ancillary jurisdiction, in
the face of Georgia's constitu-
tional venue rules.
Since 1971 when Register was
decided, Georgia appellate courts
have carried out both the letter
and the spirit of its mandate."'
Two recent cases further under-
score the current venue-related
problems of impleader. In one,
the court of appeals extended
the principle of Register, bypass-
ing an opportunity to ameliorate
its harsh rigors. In the second
case, however, the court of ap-
peals sanctioned a sleight-of-
hand method of avoiding the pit-
falls of Register.
In Louisville & Nashville R.R.
v. Bush,22 one Hogan, the driver
of an automobile, and Bush, a
guest passenger, were injured in
a car-train collision in DeKalb
County. Hogan, then a resident
of DeKalb County, filed suit
there against the railroad for her
injuries. At the same time, Bush,
the passenger, also filed suit in
DeKalb County against the de-
fendant railroad for her injuries.
Since both the Hogan suit and
the Bush suit arose out of the
same collision, the cases were
ordered consolidated for trial.
Thereafter, the trial court en-
tered an order in Bush's law suit
granting leave to the defendant
railroad to file and have served
a third-party complaint against
Hogan in which the railroad
sought contribution alleging that
Hogan as the driver of the auto-
mobile was jointly liable because
of her gross negligence in driving
into the path of the oncoming
train. Hogan moved successfully
to dismiss the third-party com-
plaint against her since she had
moved to Gwinnett County be-
tween the time of filing her com-
plaint in DeKalb County and the
time the railroad's third-party
complaint was served on her.
The cases continued to trial, and
the jury found for the railroad
in the Hogan suit and for the
passenger in the Bush suit. The
railroad appealed and enumer-
ated as one error the dismissal
for lack of venue of its third-
party claim against Hogan.
The court of appeals held,
rather woodenly, that since Ho-
gan was a resident of Gwinnett
County at the time the third-
party complaint was served
against her, the rule in Register
precluded the impleader against
her in DeKalb County. The court
might have avoided this result
by finding that Hogan had
waived venue for the purpose of
the Bush suit by filing her own
complaint against the railroad in
DeKalb County. Although it is
well established that by filing
suit a party does waive venue as
to all matters arising out of the
action brought by that party
[such as counterclaims or sepa-
rate actions to enjoin its prosecu-
tion 23 ), the court refused to hold
that a party by filing suit in a
county waives venue as to a
separate law suit between dif-
ferent parties in that county
even though both actions arise
from the same events and have
been consolidated for trial..2 4
Although the railroad still pre-
sumably can institute an action
in Gwinnett County against Ho-
gan to seek contribution for the
recovery against it in the Bush
suit, it would have been far more
economical and expeditious to
have determined the rights of all
the parties in one consolidated
trial before one judge and jury
in DeKalb County, the scene of
the accident.
In Ogden Equipment Co. v.
Talmadge Farms, Inc.,25 the
court of appeals sanctioned one
ingenious way to circumvent the
Register problem. Here, General
Electric Credit Corporation filed
suit in Fulton County against
Talmadge Farms, Inc., a resident
of Henry County. Talmadge
Farms filed its answer without
asserting its venue objections
and then filed a third-party com-
plaint against Ogden Equipment
Co., a resident of Fulton County.
Ogden moved to dismiss the
third-party complaint contending
that Talmadge Farms could not
waive venue so as to prejudice
the right of third parties in ac-
cordance with Ga. Code Ann. §
24-112.""
The court held, however, that
this statute only barred waivers
that prejudiced the legal rights
of third persons and was not
violated by a party's mere in-
convenience and expense in de-
fending an impleader action ex-
pressly allowed by the CPA. Al-
though General Electric and Tal-
madge Farms had orally agreed
on Fulton County as the forum
for the original action in order
to allow Talmadge Farm's third-
party complaint against Ogden, 7
venue was proper as to the origi-
nal defendant, Talmadge Farms,
by consent and as to Ogden, the
third-party defendant, because it
was a resident of Fulton County.
Thus, it seems that only if the
plaintiff is cooperative and will
(Continued on page 105)
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VENUE (Continued from page 73)
file suit by prearrangement in
the county of the residence of
the party sought to be im-
pleaded, can the economies of
third-party practice be had in
Georgia courts where the third-
party plaintiff and the third-
party defendant are residents of
different counties.
Counterclaims and the
"Next-Door" Plaintiff
When a plaintiff who resides
in another county files suit in
the county of the defendant's
residence, the plaintiff as a gen-
eral rule is deemed to waive his
venue objections to the forum
county so that the defendant can
assert counterclaims against him
there.28 A problem can arise,
however, when additional par-
ties must be brought in for the
purpose of deciding defendant's
counterclaim. In federal courts
the requirements of subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction and venue for
such additional parties are han-
dled by the concept of ancillary
jurisdiction.29 Thus, persons
brought into an action under
Rule 13(h) as parties to a com-
pulsory (but not a permissive)
counterclaim come within the an-
cillary jurisdiction of the court
because the compulsory counter-
claim involves the same transac-
tion or occurrence as the plain-
tiff's original action and is close-
ly connected with it. In this way
many related claims can be set-
tled within the scope of one ac-
tion.
In Georgia, however, venue
requirements loom large as the
case of Pemberton v. Purifoy
30
shows. In Pemberton a resident
of Floyd County, injured in a
multiple automobile collision,
brought an action in the Superior
Court of Whitfield County
against the defendant, a resident
of Whitfield County. The de-
fendant then asserted a counter-
claim seeking damages arising
out of the same collision against
the plaintiff and two others, the
driver and the owner of a third
automobile, involved in the ac-
cident. These last two parties
were, like the plaintiff, residents
of Floyd County. Accordingly,
the court held that venue was
improper in the Whitfield Su-
perior Court as to the counter-
claim filed against the additional
two parties. While the plaintiff,
by voluntarily instituting the suit
in Whitfield County, consented
to the jurisdiction of that court
for the purposes of his suit, the
plaintiff's action could not waive
the venue objections of others;
nor, did instituting the suit in
Whitfield County make the
plaintiff a "resident" of that
county so that the constitutional
venue rule that allows joint tort-
feasors to be sued in the county
of residence of either would be-
come applicable.
Moreover, the supreme court
has even found that venue pre-
vented the assertion of a coun-
terclaim against the plaintiff who
originally chose the forum for
the litigation. In Buford v. Bu-
ford31 a wife filed a complaint
against her husband in the Su-
perior Court of Jones County,
the county of his residence,
seeking custody of their minor
child, alimony, and other relief.
The husband then filed a coun-
terclaim in the same action seek-
ing divorce and custody of the
child. The wife moved to strike
the counterclaim for divorce for
lack of venue since the Georgia
Constitution, Ga. Code Ann. §
2-4901 (rev. 1973), fixes the ven-
ue of divorce cases in the county
in which the defendant resides,
if the defendant is a Georgia
resident. Because the wife was
a resident of Bibb County, the
court agreed that the counter-
claim for divorce could not be
asserted against her in Jones
County even though she had in-
stituted an action for alimony
and child custody there. Thus,
the supreme court ruled that the
venue requirements of the con-
stitution in divorce cases could
not be waived by a party's filing
suit outside the county of his
residence. Why the constitution-
al rule fixing venue in divorce
cases cannot be waived just like
the rule that a defendant must
be sued in the county of his resi-
dence was not explained.
Pemberton and Buford high-
light the unfortunate restrictions
that venue has placed on the use
of counterclaims. Similar venue
constraints probably also sur-
round the use of cross-claims in
Rule 13 although no reported
case has yet dealt with this is-
sue. Thus, if A sues B and C as
joint tortfeasors in the county of
B's residence, venue is proper
as to the original claim. How-
ever, based on Register, Bush,
and Pemberton, it would appear
that B could not cross-claim
against C, if C were not a resi-
dent of the forum, even though
B's claim against C involved the
same transaction or occurrence
as the main claim.
32
The Remedy:
Constitutional Revision
The obvious deficiencies in
Georgia practice and procedure
caused by the constitutional
venue requirements have not
gone unnoticed on the court. In
Buford, for example, Justice Jor-
dan joined by Justice Ingram de-
cried the uneconomical expen-
diture of judicial resources ne-
cessitated by that decision and
called for amending the consti-
tutional rules to allow counter-
claims in such cases".3 And, in
Smith v. Foster,34 a case in which
the defendant unsuccessfully
sought to use the Rule 19 joinder
of party provisions to overcome
the venue barrier to impleader,
Justice Jordan again warned that
"Georgia's hodge-podge constitu-
tional and statutory venue pro-
visions have long needed a re-
vision in light of modern day
requirements."'35
Although a creditable argu-
ment could be made that all the
problems enumerated above
could be remedied simply by ju-
dicial acceptance of a concept
of ancillary jurisdiction, old atti-
tudes die hard and nothing short
of amending the constitution to
authorize the General Assembly
to prescribe new rules of venue
by statute may suffice. Without
a constitutional change it is
doubtful that the General As-
sembly acting by statute could
wholly cure the deficiencies al-
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though it made at least a step
in the right direction during the
1975 session in expanding the
venue of actions at law against
corporations. Ga. Code Ann. §
22-5301 which provided permis-
sible places of venue for contract
and tort actions against corpora-
tions in addition to the county
where the registered office was
located was repealed by 1975 Ga.
Laws, p. 583, effective July 1,
1975. Basically, the amendment
restated and consolidated the
existing venue rules for corpora-
tions under Ga. Code Ann. § 22-
404.3r However, in connection
with the rules for tort actions, a
change was made. New section
22-404(d) now provides that a
corporation, in addition to the
county of its registered office,
"shall be deemed to reside and
may be sued for damages be-
cause of torts, wrong or injury
done, in the county where the
cause of action originated, if the
corporation transacts business in
that county. ' 37 The former rule
in § 22-5301 did not contain this
"transacts business" proviso but
rather required that the corpora-
tion have an agent, agency or
place of business there before it
could be served in the county
where the cause of action arose.
Although the measure of this
change is unclear and must await
future case-by-case development
to determine the level of activ-
ities necessary to satisfy the
"transacts business" test, the im-
port of the change is presumably
to expand the availability of
venue in tort actions against cor-
porations. Thus, it should be pos-
sible to show, for example, that
a corporation was "transacting
business" by operating a delivery
truck in the county where the
accident occurred even though
it did not have an agent, agency
or place of business in the coun-
ty at the time process was at-
tempted to be served.38
It has generally been trought
that while the General Assembly
could fix alternative places of
venue for actions against corpo-
rations,3 9 as the legislature did
in enacting Ga. Code Ann. 22-
404, it could not constitutionally
expand the places of venue for
individual natural persons.4 °
Thus, the only certain method
for expanding the places of ven-
ue for actions against individual
defendants lies in amending the
constitution.
Marshalling public concern and
support to alter the fundamental
law of the state to cure little-
known problems of venue will
not be easy. And, as Justice Car-
dozo's famous aphorism puts it:
"Not lightly to be vacated is the
verdict of quiescent years."4 1
Nevertheless, the Bar of Georgia
needs to move now to bring
about a general revision of our
venue rules.4 2
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November 21 - Board of Governors, Lake Lanier Islands
December 3-5 - Midyear Meeting, Atlanta
INSTITUTE OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
PROGRAMS
1975
October 16-17 - Civil Evidence with Emphasis on the New Federal
Rules, Lake Lanier Islands
October 28-30 - 14th Workshop for Juvenile Court Judges, Athens
October 29-31- 15th Seminar for District Attorneys, Athens
October 29-31 - 13th Seminar for Georgia Trial Judges, Athens
November 6-7 - Creditors' Rights & Bankruptcy, Savannah
November 13-14 - Creditors' Rights & Bankruptcy, Unicoi
December 11-12 - Creditors' Rights & Bankruptcy, Atlanta
1976
January 8-10 - 12th Bridge-the-Gap, Atlanta
January 23 - Real Estate IV, Augusta
January 30 - Real Estate IV, Callaway Gardens
February 6- Real Estate IV, Atlanta
February 27-28 - 21st Estate Planning Institute for Atorneys,
Trust Officers, Life Underwriters & Accountants, Athens
THE BICENTENNIAL YEAR
The Editorial Board will be meeting soon to plan for participation
next year in the bicentennial celebration. We would like to have
the benefit of your suggestions as to topics which you consider ap-
propriate for inclusion in the Journal. If you recommend a topic,
please let us know if you are willing to write the article yourself or
can suggest someone else as the author. Write Editor, Georgia State
Bar Journal, Fulton National Bank Bldg., Atlanta, GA 30303.
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